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Abstract 
With a panel of 18 OECD countries, 1980-2005, we investigate the determinants of export 
performance, in particular the effects of the size of government and institutional features. In a model 
of endogenous extent of domestically-produced goods, government size has a non-linear effect on 
export performance; the export-maximising size of government (tax receipts) is around 40-45% of 
GDP; the best size of productive government spending is around 16% of GDP. Product market and 
labour market-related rigidities affect negatively the export performance both on their own and via a 
negative effect on the effectiveness of R&D and slow down the speed of adjustment. Among 
traditional variables, relative unit labour cost, R&D shares in GDP, TFP growth and human capital 
show up significantly and with the expected signs.  
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1. Introduction 
A country’s export performance is of great concern to both academic economists and policy-makers 
for a number of inter-related reasons: Exports are a source of demand with beneficial effects on GDP 
and employment; they help improve the trade balance and alleviate external deficits; the export 
sectors may be among the most dynamic in an economic, providing an impetus for innovation and 
technological advancement. At a time when stagnation seems to be setting over large sections of the 
world economy, there is renewed focus on exports as a strategy for economic revival. As a result, the 
interest in the determinants of a country’s export performance is ongoing. This paper’s broad aim is to 
contribute to these debates. Our departure point is the landmark paper by Carlin, Glyn and Van 
Reenen (2001), which investigates factors affecting the relative exports among 14 OECD countries. 
They conclude that while well-known variables such relative unit labour costs and indices of 
technological advancement are important, they cannot by themselves explain entirely the 
developments in export shares. Among the factors that are suggested as missing include ‘deep 
structural characteristics’ of these economies. This paper’s aim is to investigate the role of two sets of 
such deep characteristics in shaping export performance, namely the size of the government sector, 
and labour and product market ‘institutions’. The findings should be of direct policy relevance, as 
well as constituting contributions to the literature.  
 
More specifically, the paper accomplishes a number of objectives. Firstly, it investigates the empirical 
relevance of traditionally highlighted factors, such as the following: Unit labour costs, as they are 
widely found to be significant determinants in empirical export regressions (Fagerberg, 1988; Carlin 
et al., 2001; Leon-Ledesma, 2005; Cavallaro and Mulino, 2009); the extent of research and 
development (R&D), as this underlies the product differentiation emphasised by new trade theory as a 
key export driver (see Helpman and Krugman, 1985; empirical validation of these models can be 
found in Hummels and Levinsohn, 1993; Leon-Ledesma, 2005; Cavallaro and Mulino, 2009; 
Athanasoglou and Bardaka, 2010). A second objective is to include ‘institutions’ among the 
determinants of export performance, particularly labour market and product market institutions, and 
the regulatory environment. The role of the former in affecting unemployment has been widely 
investigated and debated (see Nickell, 1990, 1997; Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000); product market 
competition has been argued to affect wages and unemployment (Griffith, Harrison and Macartney, 
2007); entry regulation for new firms is seen as detrimental to firm entry and growth (Djankov, La 
Porta, Lopez-DeSilanes and Shleifer, 2002; Koeniger and Prat, 2007). Knack and Keefer (1995), 
Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001), Paldam and Gundlach (2008) and Drine (2012) (among 
others) show that the quality of institutions matters for growth and development; and Gwartney, 
Holcombe and Lawson (2006) show that it also matters for the level and productivity of investment. 
These institutional features and rigidities may also impact on export performance; this should be 
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expected from the findings of Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003), for instance, that a high degree of 
rigidity in the labour market raises the cost of production substantially, preventing resources from 
moving quickly and costlessly towards more productive activities. To preamble, we find that many, 
though not all, of these institutional variables are important determinants of export performance; we 
are thus able to go forward in the direction suggested by Carlin et al. (2001) and to provide 
information of help in the design of sound institutions.  
 
A further contribution of this paper is to investigate the role of government size in promoting exports. 
The role of government in economic development continues to be debated. Critics argue that 
government crowds out utility-enhancing private consumption by wasteful public consumption 
(Mitchell, 2005); moreover, redistributive taxation may breed corruption, dependence or moral hazard 
(Sinn, 1995). Proponents of government spending and the welfare state (Atkinson, 1995a, 1995b) 
question the specifics of many of these arguments and view the international evidence on the 
government spending-growth relation as mixed. The empirical link between government size and 
economic performance is mixed (La Porta et al., 1999; Temple, 1999). Theoretical approaches 
emphasise the beneficial effects of productive public services such as maintenance of the rule of law, 
investment in infrastructure, promotion of human capital via education and health, and delineation of 
property rights and contract enforcement (Aschauer, 1989; Fisher and Turnovsky, 1995; Turnovsky, 
2000; Tsoukis and Miller, 2003; Ghosh and Roy, 2004); Irmen and Kuehnel (2009) provide a survey 
of this literature. Barro (1990) analyses both aspects of public services, the productivity-enhancing 
one and the disincentives induced by higher taxation; the growth-government size relation may be 
summarised by a hump-shaped curve. There is thus a conceptually clear optimal size of government.1 
Empirically, public investment on infrastructure has a beneficial effect on growth (Easterly and 
Rebelo, 1993; Demetriadis and Mamuneas, 2000; Canning and Pedroni, 2008). We continue this 
debate by investigating the contribution of government size to relative exports, another measure of 
macroeconomic performance. To preamble, both theoretically and empirically, we consistently and 
robustly find a hump-shaped curve of export performance versus government size along the lines of 
Barro (1990). There is a clear policy relevance of this finding: There is a government size that is best 
from the point of view of maximising exports; we discuss this government size suggested by our 
estimated regression coefficients.2  
 
                                                          
1
 Karras (1996) provides one of few attempts to empirically implement this idea and determine whether public 
services are optimally provided or not. Alesina (1999) argues that countries with low incomes tend to have 
inefficient, insufficient and corrupt government, while at high incomes, government is too much and generates 
some kind of addiction from public services. This view parallels the reasoning of Barro (1990) but reverses the 
order of causality (in Barro, causality goes from public services to growth, in Alesina it is the opposite). 
2
 This does not mean that governments do, or even should, care about export performance. Our point is that, if 
governments do care, they ought to aim for the government size that we show as maximising the export share.  
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Our investigation is related to a number of strands in the literature. Alesina and Perotti (1997) studies 
theoretically and empirically the effects on competitiveness of redistribution financed by distortionary 
taxation. Their empirical part confirms the theoretical predictions: For instance, a rise in labour tax by 
1% of GDP increases unit labour costs by as much as 3%. Our line of investigation has a different 
focus from this paper, namely we enquire about the determinants of export performance; 
competitiveness is an explanatory, rather than a dependent, variable. Moreover, we use a more recent 
and extensive panel data set than the one applied in Carlin et al. (2001). Elsewhere, the possibly bi-
directional links between institutions and trade openness have been investigated by Dollar and Kraay 
(2003), Giavazzi and Tabellini (2005), and Meon and Sekkat (2008). Institutions and their quality 
have also been linked to the pattern of trade. Levchenko (2007) and Nunn (2007) have shown that 
differences across countries in institutions such as the quality of contract enforcement and property 
rights are an important determinant of trade flows. Our paper is also related to a strand of literature 
that investigates the causality between trade openness and government size, with mixed conclusions: 
Among others, Epifani and Gancia (2009) show that higher openness leads to bigger government, 
while Benarroch and Pandey (2008) reaches exactly the opposite conclusion (greater government 
leads to lower openness). Despite their relevance, our paper seeks to address different questions: In 
particular, export performance (as measured by relative export shares) is linked to the pattern of trade 
and openness but also encompasses questions of price and non-price competitiveness. From a 
different perspective our analysis is also linked to the trade imbalances literature; see Hal et al., 
(2010) and Belke et al., (2015).  
  
To gain intuition, we firstly build a theoretical model, reviewed in Section 2: We analyse relative 
export performance in a setup that draws on the vintage model of Dornbusch, Fischer and Samuelson 
(1977). This model determines market structure (share of a unit-mass of goods produced by each of 
two countries) based on unit labour costs in a monopolistically competitive product market. In this 
basic setup the role of the state sector and institutions in promoting export performance are 
investigated. In the empirical Section 3, we investigate the relation between export performance, 
labour and product market institutions, and the size of government as measured by the total tax 
revenue-GDP ratio using a panel of 18 OECD countries, 1980-2005. The ‘institutions’ refer to labour 
(employment protection legislation) and product (barriers to entrepreneurship, competition, and FDI; 
and overall product market regulation) markets. The product market-related institutional features 
considered in the study impact negatively on international export shares via lowering the effectiveness 
of R&D; nonetheless we could not uncover any significant role for labour market-related rigidities. 
Among more traditional determinants of export performance, relative unit labour costs and R&D turn 
up as expected, while purely social (i.e., non-productive) expenditures harm international 
competiveness, in a way consistent with Alesina and Perotti (1997). Section 4 carries out further 
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robustness and sensitivity tests, while Section 5 concludes. An online Appendix outlines in greater 
detail the theoretical model of the paper.  
 
2. A Model of Government Size and Export Performance 
The theoretical model seeks to uncover the channels of influence of the size of the state sector on 
export performance. While the tax rate reduces competitiveness (Alesina and Perotti, 1997), it may 
also increase productivity via its support of productive public services (Barro, 1990). To bring these 
arguments to bear on export performance, we adapt the dynamic Ricardian model of Dornbusch, 
Fischer and Samuelson (henceforth DFS, 1977; see also Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1996, Chapter 4) 
coupled with monopolistic competition in the product and labour markets (something missing from 
the original model). We also combine this with productive public services in the manner of Barro 
(1990). In contrast to the supply-side model of Barro (1990), here demand is determined first, and 
then labour demand is determined residually. The production function is characterised by a constant 
elasticity of substitution. There is also the possibility of unemployment in the labour market, and 
hence a meaningful role for trade unionism. This links up with a rich literature on the effects of union 
behaviour (see Nickell, 1990, for a survey). These are valuable extensions of DFS (1977) in their own 
right and never so far incorporated into the same model. The main focus here is to highlight the 
effects of state size and institutions on competitiveness and ultimately export performance.  
 
There is a continuum of goods, i∈[0,1] that are internationally tradable. A fraction, 0 1z< <  of them 
is produced by the Home economy (H), and the rest by the Foreign economy (F - the latter will be 
indicated by starred variables). We indicate by iα  and *iα  the unit labour requirements (inverse 
productivity) for each good i in each of the two countries. Thus, the ratio *( ) i
i
A i α
α
≡  indicates the 
relative productivity of H concerning good i. Later on, we shall consider also broader interpretations 
of productivity and A(i) that bear on institutions. We index the goods such that ( ) 0A i′ < ; thus, H has 
a relative productivity advantage for goods with a low i and F in those with a high i.  
 
Due to the monopolistic structure of the goods market, producers in all sectors enjoy a monopolistic 
markup of price over marginal cost ( µ >0); so, the generic producer j sets their price according to: 
 
( )1 i
i B
W
P
µ α+
=
  (1)  
W is the nominal wage producer i faces, common across the domestic economy; it is determined by 
institutional characteristics of the labour market. Where Β is productivity; it will be defined more 
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precisely below. The markup µ  is exogenous, reflecting institutional/regulatory structure, and differs 
across the two economies. Allowing for a different mark-up and nominal wage, symmetry applies to 
pricing in the foreign market. All goods for which *( )i iP P< > will be produced by the Home 
(Foreign) economy. In view of the pricing rule, therefore, good i will be produced by H if: 
 
( )
*
* * *1 (1 )i i
B
W
B
Wµ α µ α+ +
<
 
The marginal good z by definition equalises costs across the two economies:  
 
( ) * * *
*
1 (1 )z zW W
B B
µ α µ α+ +
=
 (2) 
Any good i z<  will be produced by H and j z> will be produced by F. We may therefore interpret z 
(0 1)z< < as the (endogenous) extent of ‘market capture’ by the Home economy. 
 
Given our definition of relative productivity, *( ) i
i
A i α
α
≡  , ( ) 0A i′ < , and the condition for the 
marginal good, z,  (2), we have: 
 
( )
( )* **
1 /
1 /z
W B
A
W B
µ
µ
+  
=
 + 
 (3) 
Since A is an inverse function of i, the extent of H production (z) rises with the foreign product 
markup and nominal wage and falls with the domestic ones. The exogenously given curvature of the 
A(i) function also plays a role: Apart from reflecting productivity in a narrow sense, this may also be 
interpreted as a country’s institutional features that have a bearing on productivity, as alluded to 
above. A rise in relative productivity by the domestic economy, indicated by a shift in 1/ ( )A i  such 
that the new distribution is first-order stochastically dominated by the old, implies that the domestic 
economy is more productive across the board. This may be interpreted as a technological 
improvement but it may also be a business-friendly institutional change: The extent of H production 
(z) rises.  
 
Individual good production is characterised by the simple technology: 
 
i
i
i
BLY
α
=  (4) 
As in Barro (1990), productivity (B) is underpinned by public services. Public services are supported 
by levying a flat tax at rate (τ) across all incomes; a balanced budget is assumed, so this rate also 
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equals the public services-GDP ratio. Public services are assumed non-rival and not subject to 
congestion. Accordingly, productivity is specified as: 
 ( )B Y βτ=  (5) 
In order to provide services, the government is assumed to buy all goods (worldwide) in the same 
proportion as individual consumers. The parameter  0 1β< <  captures the production effectiveness 
of a given level of public services, and may therefore be interpreted as a measure of institutionally-
determined efficiency in the model. In view of our specification for productive public services (5), (3) 
becomes: 
 
( )
( )* * *
1 / ( )
1 /z
W Y
A
W B
βµ τ
µ
+  
=
 + 
 (6) 
Totally-differentiating, we find that the tax rate will affect the degree of H production (z) as follows: 
 
(1 )
1
( )
z
A z
γ φ β
τ
τ
τ
−
−∂
−
=
′∂
 (7) 
where γ>0 is the strength of the union and φ>0 is its degree of centralisation. (More details of the 
model are given in the online Appendix.) 
The first term in the numerator, (1 )
1
γ φ
τ
−
−
, captures the effect of the tax on the bargained real wage 
between the firm and the union (see Proposition 1 below for parameter definitions) and 
( )(.) 0A iA
i
∂
′ ≡ <
∂
. Therefore, we have the following sign: 
 { } ,  (1 )
z
sgn sgn βτ τ τ β γ φτ
∂ 
= − − ≡
+∂  −
 (8) 
	(8) defines a threshold tax rate, τ around which the balance of effects of the tax rate on the degree of 
specialisation changes sign: The two effects are a positive one via public services and a negative one 
via the effect on the union-bargained wage. We thus get a hump-shaped graph of ( )z τ , which 
parallels the graph of growth on the tax rate in Barro (1990), but does not seem to have been derived 
in the export literature. We therefore get an optimal tax rate, and government size (because of the 
balanced budget), from the point of view of maximising z, the extent of Home production and its 
‘capture’ of world markets. A rise in the level of productivity, technical or institutional, as captured by 
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A(i), raises z
τ
∂
∂
 by reducing (.)A′  for all i. Though this will increase z, it will not change the 
optimal tax rate τ . These results are summarised in the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 1: On the determinants of Home production (z): 
a) The tax rate exerts a dual effect on the degree of market capture by H (z): positively, via the 
productivity-enhancing public services, and negatively via the effect on the bargained real 
wage derived from union behaviour. The balance of the two effects gives the tax threshold, τ
,this is the optimal government size with respect to the maximisation of the share by H of 
world production (z).  
b) The strength of the union (greater γ) exacerbates the negative effect of the tax on the wage, as 
the union is better able to compensate for the loss of net pay in negotiations, and therefore 
reduces the threshold tax rate,τ . 
c) A more centralised union (higherφ) mitigates the negative effects in (b), as the union 
internalises the negative externalities caused by its actions; hence it increases the threshold 
tax rateτ . 
d) Institutionally-determined efficiency (β) increases z and the threshold tax rate.  
e) Ceteris paribus, a greater degree of technological or institutional productivity, manifested in 
the productivity term ( )A z′ , increases the effect that the tax rate has on the extent of Home 
production, z.  
Proof: All parts of the proposition readily follow from (A.20) in online Appendix A.  
 
Additional results can be obtained with further analysis of the model, not shown here for economy of 
space. In particular, we get the following on export performance (taken as the share of H in world 
exports, one of the measures that will be used in Section 3):  
Proposition 2: Determinants of relative export performance: 
a) For a sufficiently low tax rate (below the threshold specified in (b) below), relative export 
performance falls with trade union strength (γ), rises with trade union internalisation of the 
effects of its actions ( ,ϕ φ ) and rises with productivity ( ( )A z′ )).  
b) Institutionally-determined efficiency (β) increases the export ratio at least for a sufficiently 
low tax rate; but its effect on the threshold tax rate is not clear-cut. 
c) The threshold tax here is lower than the threshold tax rate that maximises Home production 
or output. This is because of the effects of taxation on Home and Foreign demand. 
9 
 
Proof: All parts of the proposition readily follow from (A.27) in online Appendix A. It is also 
easy to show that the same effects apply when we measure export performance of H by this 
country’s exports-GDP ratio.  
 
 
3. Estimation 
Building upon the implications of the theoretical framework of Section 2, this Section estimates the 
relationship between measures of the state sector, institutions and export performance. We begin by 
discussing the data, before proceeding to empirical specifications. 
 
3.1 Basic data  
Our data sample consists of 18 OECD countries for the period 1980-2005, a more recent and 
extensive panel than our closely related precursor studies (Alesina and Perotti, 1997; Carlin et al., 
2001).3 Our overall strategy is to regress export shares on variables that capture state size and 
institutions, as well as cost competitiveness. As is standard in the literature (see Amendola et al., 
1993; Carlin et al., 2001; Montobbio, 2003), export performance is measured as the share of country’s 
exports to total world exports (data from UNCTAD)4; we also carry out robustness analysis using the 
export-GDP ratio. Cost competitiveness is proxied by an index of Relative Unit Labour Costs 
(RULC). We use data from EU KLEMS Growth and Productivity Accounts, 2009 edition 
(www.euklems.net), on value added, labour compensation and number of employees to construct Unit 
Labour Costs relative to our sample means (of 18 OECD countries), following standard practice IN 
applied trade modelling (see among others, Athanasoglou and Bardaka (2010)).5 We control for 
technological complexity and product differentiation of exports using a measure of industry-funded 
R&D as a percentage of GDP taken from Science and Technology Indicators, OECD (2010 edition).  
 
The government size variables are taken from the OECD. As a first proxy of government size, we use 
the total tax revenue as a share of GDP; we shall use both the variable itself and its quadratic to 
uncover any possible Barro (1990)-style hump curve of the type highlighted above. As state 
expenditures do not only support productivity-enhancing public services but also include transfer 
payments and other social types of expenditure, which may induce only the disincentive or 
distortionary effects of taxation without any impact on productivity, any estimated positive effect of 
government size on exports may be interpreted as understating the true effect, and therefore being a 
                                                          
3
 We rely on different sources for the various data series; merging these data sources results in our sample. 
4
 ‘Total world exports’ is defined here as the sum of exports of the 18 countries in the sample. 
5
 Further details for the construction of RULC can be found in Appendix C. 
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low bound. In order to investigate further the possibility that some government spending is not 
productive (but does entail taxation), we proceed in a dual way: Firstly, we also include separately the 
purely social spending alongside total tax receipts; secondly, we disentangle purely social spending 
from government expenditure using a variable of productive government spending (Gpr). A number of 
other variables will be described as we go along. Online Appendix B summarises the data sources, 
descriptive statistics, and graphs for competitiveness, export performance, taxation, and R&D. 
 
3.2: Institutional rigidities 
The institutional feature (or ‘rigidities’) that we consider are the empirical counterpart to the 
parameter β of Section 2, which controls for the effectiveness of the public services in the aggregate 
production function, and which was found in general to increase the home economy’s production, 
capture of export markets and relative export performance (see Proposition 2). Institutional rigidities 
are likely to be economy-wide but they affect disproportionally the more dynamic and innovative. As 
such, such rigidities can impact disproportionately on the effectiveness of R&D, which is crucial in 
building a knowledge-based economy with a competitive edge in innovation and product quality. 
Therefore, we have entered these institutional rigidities in the regressions below both on their own 
and as interaction terms with R&D.6
 
 Thus, our empirical specification (9 – see the next sub-Section) 
is augmented by the terms: ( )2 3 ,1 &h hc c c tIns β θIns R Dβ + + , where hIns stands for the h-th 
institutional index: h=EPL, Bar.Enter, Bar.Comp, Bar.FDI. 
The first institutional index considered refers to Employment Protection Legislation (EPL), see Cahuc 
and Postel-Vinay, (2002) for further evidence on this index in the unemployment literature. This 
index ranges from 0 (a fully liberal labour market without any protection) to 6 (fully protective).7 It is 
a standard argument that economies with heavily protected labour markets are less mobile hindering 
the allocation of resources towards more dynamic and efficient units (Nickell, 1997; Nicoletti and 
Scarpeta, 2003). Furthermore, recent studies in the literature of applied industrial organisation and 
growth (Besley and Burgess, 2004; Rodrik, 2005 Arnold et al., 2008) have pointed out that rigid 
markets increase the cost of adjustment, hurting in particular those industries that have the potential to 
excel in international markets. The second measure to be considered therefore is ‘barriers to 
entrepreneurship’ (Bar.Enter), capturing administrative regulation that impacts negatively on 
economic performance. Such regulation includes the existence of cartel practices, the extent of 
                                                          
6
 These institutional indices are only reported for three years (1988, 2003, and 2008); furthermore they change 
slowly over time, so that they are almost time invariant. As a result, we entered them only as country means; this 
means that they could only be entered multiplicatively (i.e., in order to avoid perfect multicollinearity with 
country dummies). Furthermore, as they may be highly correlated, they cannot all enter simultaneously.  
7
 All the institutional indices used in the empirics are taken from the OECD. They all range between 0 and 6, 
with values close to 6 indicating a very stringent market while values close to 0 mean a very market-friendly 
environment. 
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bureaucratic procedures for setting up a new business or start-up costs, and poor legislation.8 High 
barriers to entrepreneurship are associated with weak product market competition that lead once again 
to efficiency losses. The third index of institutional rigidities is ‘barriers to competition’ (Bar.Comp). 
It reflects market distortions that prevent fair competition and lead once again to inefficiencies. The 
last specification presented in Table 2 includes ‘barriers to FDI’ (Bar.FDI), i.e. impediments and 
obstacles that restrain inward FDI investment. These can be harmful to export performance: there is a 
long tradition in the FDI literature that highlights the role of foreign capital stock in promoting 
technological expertise and knowledge spillovers (De Mello, 1997, Braconier and Sjöholm, 1998).  
 
3.3 Export performance and institutional rigidities: A baseline specification 
In Table 1, we begin with a benchmark testable equation with four key variables:  
 
( ), 0 1 , 2 3 ,
2
4 , 5 , ,6 ,
1 &
( )
h h
c t c t c c c t
c t c t c t c t
Exp RULC Ins Ins R D
Tax Tax Soc u
= + + +
+ + + +
+β β β β θ
β β β        (9) 
Where, for each country c in our sample and at time t: Exp
 
is the export share relative to total exports 
of OECD countries; RULC
 
indicates unit labour costs relative to OECD; Tax
 
is the share of total tax 
revenue relative to GDP; SOC is the share of social, therefore non-productivity-enhancing, 
expenditures to GDP; R&D 
 
stands for the share of private R&D in GDP. The relevance of all these 
key variables was discussed above.9 We have commented on the institutional features, introduced 
both on their own and multiplicatively with R&D, in sub-section 3.2 above. 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
 
Our pooled OLS baseline estimates for (9) are shown in Table 1.10 We control for heterogeneity 
across countries by augmenting (9) with fixed effects (country dummies) as well as controlling for 
common global macroeconomic shocks using year dummies: The F-test and associated p-values at the 
bottom of the Table refers to the joint statistical significance of these dummies. On the whole, these 
results present a successful basic model of export performance with institutional characteristics (on 
which more below) and government size alongside more standard arguments. The estimated 
coefficient of RULC is negative confirming the adverse effect of cost performance on exporting 
                                                          
8
 We refer the reader to Nicoletti et al. (1999) for the exact definitions of these indices as well as their empirical 
construction. Table B1 of the online Appendix displays mean values for the countries of our sample.  
9
 As all variables, including the dependent one (export share), are shares or ratios, therefore bounded between 0 
and 1, they were considered as I(0) variables. 
10
 The intercept is not reported; in any case, it was dropped when fixed effects were allowed for. 
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activity. The private R&D-GDP ratio is on the whole significantly positive, indicating that the ability 
of OECD countries to innovate and provide differentiated products in international markets 
constitutes a crucial source of competitive edge. The coefficient of social expenditure Soc is 
significantly negative confirming the findings of Alesina and Perotti (1997). The level term of the tax 
share is positive and significant its quadratic term is significantly negative, suggesting that the export-
state size relationship can be more accurately described by a hump-shaped curve, along the lines 
explored in Section 2 and echoing Barro (1990).  
The institutional variables show up significant on their own but not always with the expected sign; 
barriers to entry and to competition appear with a positive sign on their own. The interaction terms 
between each of these rigidities and R&D are negative and significant, confirming the theoretical 
priors: The higher is the degree of market rigidity (higher values for any of Insh), the lower is the 
impact of a higher R&D-GDP ratio on export performance.  
 
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
 
Table 2 replicates the specification of Table 1 with the augmentation of three additional variables in 
the same line of argument with Carlin et al. (2001). These variables are TFP growth (TFP), Human 
Capital (HC) and property rights (Rights). TFP accounts for disembodied technical change (source: 
OECD-Productivity Statistics database); human capital is measured as the share of population with a 
University degree (Source: Barro-Lee data set (2013)) and represents the quality of labour force in a 
country while the index of property rights is a composite index that measures the quality of legal 
system and the protection of property rights (Source: Economic Freedom of the World (EFW) 
database (2014)).11  This index takes values from 0 to 1012 and indicates how effectively the protective 
functions of the government are performed. Values closer to the upper bound imply a country with an 
effective legal system. We assume that the Rights index captures- in a broadly defined manner- the 
quality of the institutional framework that is essential for the efficient function of the market The 
estimated coefficients of the three new variables are significant and with the expected signs. The 
institutional variables now appear mostly significant and with the expected signs (negative) both on 
their own and in their interactions with R&D. Otherwise, little else changes from Table 1 in either the 
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 The Rights index used in this paper is slightly different from the corporate ownership used in Carly et al. 
(2001) but we believe that our index is also appropriate in reflecting to what extent the institutional environment 
protects and promotes productive activity. In other words, countries with high degree of economic freedom are 
those that enjoy a highly effective system of legal protection. 
12
 The Rights index is formed by four sub-components that all capture aspects of legal system, these are: the rule 
of law, property rights, independence of the judiciary and impartial and effective enforcement of the law.  
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sign or significance of the other regressors or the measures of fit. Results in Table 2 clearly suggest 
that the inclusion of factors that measure country’s capacity in terms of either exogenous 
technological progress or quality-adjusted labour does not alter the importance of taxation on 
country’s international competitiveness.   
The optimal (export performance-maximising) tax share implied by the estimates is shown as ̂; this is 
the empirical counterpart to τ  in (8). It is related to the estimated coefficients as follows, considering 
(9); as the empirical variable Tax≡100*τ, the tax-GDP ratio that maximises export performance is 
given by differentiating (9): 
 
4
5
ˆ
200
=
β
τ β  (10) 
Based on (10) and estimates in Tables 1 and 2, the tax share (̂) that maximises export shares in 
international markets is of the order of 40-45%.  These figures should be interpreted with extra 
cautiousness as the present measure of Tax share covers both redistributive transfers and productive 
government spending. In order to purge the effect of redistributive transfers in the previous estimate, 
we calculate a more narrowly defined variable of productive government spending that excludes 
redistributive transfers from government consumption (as % of GDP). When this variable is entered in 
the regressions instead of tax share the implied ‘best’ (export share-maximising) government size 
appears to be in the order of 16%.13  
 
4. Sensitivity Analysis for Baseline Specifications 
We next implement some sensitivity analysis to test the robustness of our main results shown in 
Tables 1 and 2. The main focus of these robustness checks is to control for endogeneity bias as well as 
to capture the dynamics in the exports share equation. 
 
4.1 Accounting for potential endogeneity bias: IV estimation 
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
The exogeneity assumption underpinning the OLS estimates of Tables 1 and 2 may be too strong, as 
the causality between exports and the relative unit labour cost (RULC) can be two-way. For example, 
export expansion is likely to increase profitability, encouraging workers to request higher wages 
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 These estimates are available from the authors upon request.  
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leading thus to higher labour compensation and RULC.14 Two strategies are followed to mitigate the 
potential endogeneity bias. Firstly, lag all regressors in (9) once, so as to satisfy the assumption of 
weak exogeneity; the results are shown in column 1 of Table 3. In this case, the OLS can still provide 
unbiased estimates. Nonetheless, this modification does not preclude the possibility that current 
export shares might cause feedback effects to future values of RULC, thus violating strict exogeneity. 
For unbiased results in this case, we use Instrumental Variables (IV). We use contemporaneous and 
one year lag values  of GFCF, and ENE as instruments, where GFCF is the gross fixed capital 
formation-GDP ratio and ENE is the energy of oil equivalent per capita.15  
Table 3 reports the results for specifications that control for endogeneity bias. The dependent variable 
is the export share in total (OECD) exports (Exp); results for the export-GDP ratio are similar and not 
shown for economy of space. At the bottom of the Table 3 values of key diagnostic tests are reported: 
The Wald test refers to hypothesis whether the regressors included are jointly statistically significant. 
The Davidson-MacKinnon statistic tests the exogeneity assumption, under the null this statistic it is 
distributed as F(m, N-K), where m is the number of potentially endogenous variables. A rejection of 
the null casts doubt about the validity of OLS estimates. The Sargan-Hansen statistic tests the 
orthogonality condition for a panel and is distributed under the null as χ2L-K, where L is the number of 
excluded instruments in the original equation and K is the number of regressors.  Intuitively, Sargan-
Hansen tests the validity of instruments, a non-rejection of the null indicates that the instruments used 
identify correctly the equation. Estimates in Table 3 are very similar to those obtained from OLS in 
Tables 1 and 2. Assuming weak exogeneity between RULC and export shares affects only the 
significance of the R&D coefficient. Regarding the institutional variables, either on their own or 
interacted with R&D, estimates are consistent with the results of Table 1 and 2. Taken as a whole, this 
sensitivity test indicates that results from OLS baseline specifications are not biased severely from 
unobserved measurement errors and endogeneity bias, maintaining the main message that institutional 
rigidities influence negatively export shares while state size has a non-linear relationship with export 
performance. 
  
4.2: Dynamic Panel specifications 
 
Equation (9) which underpins the results of Tables 1 to 3 represents a static long-run equilibrium 
relation between exports and the various export determinants. It does not allow for country differences 
in the speed of adjustment towards the long-run equilibrium. The dynamic specification (9΄) below 
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 If so, the relation would be positive, not the negative one shown by the estimated parameters. But the key 
thing is, there is potentially reverse causality between the two variables.  
15
 Data are taken from World Bank Development Indicators. 
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allows for different adjustment process in each country which is another way to capture idiosyncratic 
differences. To this end, (9) is augmented to: 
 
( ), 0 , 1 1 , 2 ,
2
3 , 4 , 5 , ,
&
( )
h
c t c c t c t c t
c t c t c t c t
Exp Ins Exp RULC R D
Tax Tax Soc u
−
= + Γ + + +
+ + + +
γ θ γ γ
γ γ γ
 
  (9΄) 
By allowing for a variable speed of adjustment, (1-(Γ+θ Insh)), this structure allows us to identify the 
factors driving this speed. The coefficient of adjustment now includes the interaction with an 
institutional index h; these institutional features now are a slightly different set: Insh, h=EPL, 
Bar.Enter, PMR, where PMR is an index of product market regulation (measured in a similar fashion 
as the other indicators, from 0 – least regulated, to 6 – most restrictively regulated; source: OECD). 
Under the null hypothesis of instantaneous adjustment, the estimated coefficient of the lagged 
dependent variable is zero while the alternative suggests that there is partial adjustment. Therefore, a 
positive estimate of θ can be regarded as evidence that countries with high degree of institutional 
inflexibility in a particular aspect of economic activity adjust more slowly to long run equilibrium.16 
The presence of a lagged dependent variable in (9΄) implies that a fixed effects estimator will be 
biased. The size of the bias as shown in Nickell (1981) depends on panel dimensionality; it is 
decreasing in the number of years, so for a sufficient number of years the potential bias converges to 
zero. In our data set the number of years (T= 25) and greater than the number of countries (N=18) and 
thus we estimate (9΄) using a Dynamic Least Squared Dummy (DLSD) variable estimator as 
suggested in Everaert and Pozzi (2007) 
 
ENTER TABLES 4 AND 5 HERE 
 
Results from dynamic specification (9΄) are shown in Table 4.  The long-run coefficients are obtained 
by the following transformation:
1
jγ
− Γ
. These long-run coefficients are shown in Table 5. FE 
coefficients from dynamic specification are smaller than the static ones reported in Table 1 mainly 
due to the presence of the lagged dependent variable. The coefficients are on the whole insignificant 
with the exception of RULC that remains significant at 1%. The non-linear structure of taxation is still 
present; however both terms are far from significant levels and the implied export share-maximising 
tax shares now lies between 26% and 31.5%.  Regarding institutions, not all variables play the same 
                                                          
16Due to the fact that the institutional indices change very slowly over time, we consider sample mean for each 
country. 
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role in the convergence process towards the long-run equilibrium. In the first column of Table 5, the 
interacted term of lagged export share with employment protection legislation (EPL) is insignificant 
while chronic rigidities in product market regulation (PMR) and entrepreneurship (Bar.Enter) are 
shown to significantly decelerate the speed of adjustment.  
A potential deficiency of a fixed effects estimator is the homogeneity assumption imposed to all slope 
coefficients except that of the lagged dependent variable and the intercept. This restriction does not 
allow us to investigate the short-run dynamics of different variables. For that purpose, we also 
consider a Pooled Mean Group (PMG) estimator of Pesaran et al. (1999) that permits all short–run 
coefficients to differ across countries while maintains homogeneity of long run elasticities in variables 
of interest. The following model is specified for the PMG procedure:  
, , 1 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 0,
1, , 1 2, , 1 3, , 1 4, , 1
1, , 2 2, , 2 3, , 1 4, , 1 ,
( & )
&
&
c t c c t c t c t c t c t c
c c t c c t c c t c c t
c c t c c t c c t c c t c t
exp exp a RULC a R D a Tax a Soc a
b RULC b R D b Tax b Soc
d RULC d R D d Tax d Soc u
λ
−
− − − −
− − − −
∆ = − − − − − −
+ ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ +
+ ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ +
               (9΄΄) 
where λ
 
is the speed of adjustment to long run relationship, parameters a  stand for the long run 
elasticities of export shares and parameters b and d denote the coefficients of short run dynamics.17   
 
ENTER TABLES 6 AND 7 HERE 
 
The PMG estimates are reported in Table 6. The corresponding estimates of first and second order 
differences for individual countries are reported in Table 7. Export performance is negatively 
associated with RULC, Tax and Social expenditure shares and positively related to R&D. These 
estimates as well as all estimates from static specifications throughout the paper establish a robust 
result about the long-run negative effect of state size in export performance. The short-run coefficients 
in Table 7 are not always telling the same story. The coefficient of first order tax share difference is 
positive in 11 out of 18 countries while the coefficient of second order tax difference is positive only 
in 8. The pattern of R&D coefficient in first and second order differences is negative in many 
countries indicating the time required for innovative activity to be converted into substantial export 
gains. A broad conclusion from the comparison of short- and long-run estimates is that temporary 
increases in government size influence positively export performance while permanent movements in 
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 We currently choose a lag structure up to 2 years to ensure enough degrees of freedom required for supporting 
statistical inference. 
17 
 
government size impact negatively on exports. Such a pattern signifies the existence of a non-linear 
relationship as documented in all Tables throughout the paper. 
 
Overall, the results from both static and dynamic specifications reveal a new message which has not 
been highlighted in the literature so far. Nickell et al. (2008) have found that strong protectionism in 
the labour market slows down the speed of dynamic adjustment preventing a fast reallocation of 
resources. The findings of the present study suggest that a high degree of protection in the labour 
market is not very costly and its negative impact on the reallocation of resources is only minor (Tables 
1, 2, 3 and 4). From the present analysis, it becomes apparent that there are other institutional 
rigidities more damaging for a country’s international competitiveness. So far gone unnoticed, this 
finding has a critical policy implication: countries that seek to increase export market shares should 
implement reforms that eliminate barriers to competition and other product market-related chronic 
inefficiencies rather than attempting labour market liberalising policies. 
 
5. Summary and conclusions 
This paper investigates the role of government size and labour and product market ‘institutions’ 
(features and rigidities) in determining export performance of OECD economies. We view the current 
state of the literature on empirical export performance as suggesting that competitiveness and unit 
labour costs are quite important determinants but do leave room for improvement in the explanation 
of export shares, an argument exemplified by Carlin et al. (2001). In addition to the ‘deep’ 
structural/institutional characteristics suggested in that paper as further determinants, there are good 
grounds to argue that government size may also play an important explanatory role. Following the 
reasoning of Barro (1990), the role of this variable is likely to be non-linear. Thus, our main 
contribution is to investigate the (possibly non-linear) role of government size and various 
institutional features in shaping export performance, in addition to the role of unit labour costs and 
competitiveness. To this end, we first present a theoretical model of export performance, whose role is 
to formalise and sharpen these insights. The model, an extension of Dornbusch, Fischer and 
Samuelson (1997) with monopolistic competition, also includes a role for government, trade unions, 
and other labour market institutional features. Indeed, both sets of variables, government size and 
institutions, are shown to be relevant, the former in a Barro (1990)-type non-linear way.  
 
Our results may be summarised as follows. Among the variables traditionally emphasised as 
determinants of international export shares, relative unit labour costs and the share of R&D 
expenditures in GDP continue to play a significant role in the expected way. Our contribution is that 
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we uncover a significant role for government in shaping export performance: The estimated 
coefficients of the tax shares in GDP, as measures of the size of government and public services, and 
their quadratic terms verify the pattern suggested by the previous theoretical arguments in a consistent 
fashion. These terms are almost always significant, revealing a non-linear effect on export shares that 
implies an export-maximising government size (total tax receipts as a share of GDP) of the order of 
around 40-45% of GDP. The share of productive government spending that maximises export 
performance is much lower, however, around 16%. To our knowledge, there is little precedent in 
estimating an optimal government size along these lines; hence this is a new contribution that sheds 
light to a new aspect that is the link between government size and international competitiveness. We 
perform a range of robustness checks related to alternative measure of export performance, and 
accounting for a potential endogeneity bias via IV estimation, and dynamics.  
The institutional features we consider include measures of labour market rigidity (strength of trade 
unionism and employment protection) and product market rigidity (barriers to entrepreneurship, 
competition, FDI and a measure of product market regulation). On the whole, the econometric 
analysis reveals a significant role for institutional rigidities. This type of institutional stringency has 
been found to be distortive for international competitiveness and as our results show their negative 
effect on export shares is via reducing the effectiveness of R&D.  Quite independently of the tax 
share, social expenditure, which is entirely non-productive in nature, maintains a robust negative sign 
clearly establishing a negative role of the welfare state regarding export performance, as suggested by 
Alesina and Perotti (1997): The obvious interpretation is that the funds for implementing a welfare 
policy are derived from taxation, causing a loss of efficiency and harming competitiveness. We also 
uncover evidence that product market regulation and barriers to entrepreneurship decelerate the speed 
of adjustment to new equilibria and therefore slow down the response of the economy to policy 
initiatives. Finally, both static and dynamic specifications reveal that barriers to competition and other 
product market-related distortions are more damaging for a country’s export performance 
international competitiveness than labour market-related rigidities.  
In all, these results should be both interesting contributions to the literature and policy 
recommendations as countries strive to reform their institutions and try to forge successful export-
oriented recovery strategies. The key recommendation is that countries should pursue export-
promotion based on the dual strategy of targeted, productive public services and a dynamic product 
market avoiding the institutional rigidities highlighted in this study.   
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Table 1: Export performance among OECD countries, 1980-2005; Baseline Estimates 
 Spec1 Spec2 Spec3 Spec4 
RULC -3.877*** -4.117*** -3.735*** -4.588*** 
 (-5.57) (-6.25) (-5.74) (-6.96) 
R&D -0.350 5.097*** 2.780*** 3.277*** 
 (-0.40) (5.48) (3.11) (5.55) 
EPL -0.374***    
 (-2.90)    
Bar.Enter  11.031***   
  (16.76)   
Bar.Comp   1.224***  
   (2.79)  
Bar.FDI    -6.383*** 
    (-11.82) 
R&D×EPL 0.362    
 (0.87)    
R&D×Bar.Enter  -2.150***   
  (-5.00)   
R&D×Bar.Comp   -1.163**  
   (-2.53)  
R&D×Bar.FDI    -1.978*** 
    (-5.10) 
Tax 0.282*** 0.323*** 0.282*** 0.307*** 
 (4.48) (5.59) (4.58) (5.37) 
(Tax)2 -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.004*** 
 (-4.07) (-4.88) (-3.83) (-4.65) 
Soc.Share -0.043*** -0.035*** -0.034*** -0.030*** 
 (-3.68) (-3.47) (-3.22) (-2.91) 
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 438 438 438 438 
Adjusted R2 0.9853 0.9864 0.9857 0.9862 
F 855.905 912.759 916.766 926.027 
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
The dependent variable is the share of exports relative to total OECD exports. Numbers in brackets 
below coefficients refer to absolute t-statistics. Asterisks denote significance as: *** at 1%, ** at 5%. 
These are OLS estimates robust for arbitrary group-wise heteroscedasticity. Coefficients reported are 
semi-elasticities calculated at the sample mean of each variable. The F-statistic refers to the joint 
significance of country dummies. 
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Table 2: Export performance among OECD countries, 1980-2005; augmented model 
 Spec1 Spec2 Spec3 Spec4 
RULC -4.178*** -4.101*** -4.042*** -4.990*** 
 (-5.58) (-5.80) (-5.66) (-7.29) 
R&D 0.019 3.818*** 1.427* 3.360*** 
 (0.02) (4.45) (1.75) (5.42) 
Tax 0.372*** 0.385*** 0.363*** 0.403*** 
 (4.73) (5.38) (4.65) (5.67) 
(Tax)2 -0.004*** -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.005*** 
 (-4.67) (-5.05) (-4.36) (-5.32) 
Soc.Share -0.019 -0.009 -0.015 -0.001 
 (-1.48) (-0.77) (-1.17) (-0.10) 
EPL -0.635***    
 (2.83)    
Bar.Enter  -6.980***   
  (18.83)   
Bar.Comp   -15.514***  
   (13.83)  
Bar.FDI    -6.928*** 
    (-10.03) 
R&D×EPL 0.085    
 (0.22)    
R&D×Bar.Enter  -1.634***   
  (-4.10)   
R&D×Bar.Comp   -0.591  
   (-1.42)  
R&D×Bar.FDI    -2.167*** 
    (-5.31) 
TFP 0.397*** 0.320*** 0.367*** 0.446*** 
 (3.89) (3.41) (3.51) (4.64) 
HC 0.109*** 0.131*** 0.110*** 0.133*** 
 (3.43) (4.36) (3.53) (4.49) 
Rights 0.501*** 0.398*** 0.479*** 0.463*** 
 (3.87) (2.70) (3.54) (3.20) 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 413 413 413 413 
Adjusted R2 0.9864 0.9870 0.9865 0.9877 
F 716.829 705.720 650.819 640.177 
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
The dependent variable is the share of exports relative to total OECD exports. Numbers in brackets 
below coefficients refer to absolute t-statistics. Asterisks denote significance as: *** at 1%, ** at 5%. 
These are OLS estimates robust for arbitrary group-wise heteroscedasticity. Coefficients reported are 
semi-elasticities calculated at the sample mean of each variable. The F-statistic refers to the joint 
significance of country dummies.  
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Table 3: Export performance among OECD countries, 1980-2005: IV Estimation 
 OLS IV IV IV IV IV 
RULC(t-1) -3.21***      
 (-5.04)      
R&D(t-1) 0.57***      
 (3.65)      
Tax(t-1) 0.34***      
 (5.90)      
(Tax)2(t-1) -0.00***      
 (-5.38)      
Soc.Share -0.03***      
 (-3.24)      
RULC  -5.12*** -5.12* -6.90*** -4.48 -6.76*** 
  (-4.08) (-1.88) (-4.51) (-1.39) (-2.66) 
R&D  0.35* -0.05 5.67** 2.47 3.64*** 
  (1.88) (-0.05) (2.18) (0.99) (3.05) 
Tax  0.27*** 0.27** 0.29** 0.27** 0.28** 
  (3.62) (2.10) (2.33) (2.12) (2.26) 
(Tax)2  -0.01*** -0.003* -0.004** -0.003* -0.004* 
  (-3.14) (-1.92) (-2.00) (-1.84) (-1.89) 
Soc.Share  -0.037** -0.037 -0.022 -0.032 -0.022 
  (-2.48) (-0.87) (-0.72) (-0.91) (-0.57) 
EPL   -19.37***    
   (-14.07)    
Bar.Enter    -37.17***   
    (46.12)   
Bar.Comp     -24.53***  
     (10.71)  
Bar.FDI      -29.5*** 
      (-33.28) 
R&D×EPL   0.21    
   (0.39)    
R&D×Bar.Enter    -2.43**   
    (-2.02)   
R&D×Bar.Comp     -1.01  
     (-0.80)  
R&D×Bar.FDI      -2.24*** 
      (-2.73) 
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
-Observations 421 421 421 421 421 421 
Adjusted R2 0.985  0.985 0.985 0.985 0.985 
F 1004      
p 0.000      
Wald  29600 29574 31263 30464 31206 
Davidson-
MacKinnon 
 6.23 
(0.01) 
5.99 
(0.01) 
2.65 
(0.10) 
1.07 
(0.30) 
5.10 
(0.02) 
Sargan-Hansen  3.806 
(0.28) 
4.170 
(0.24) 
2.145 
(0.54) 
11.480 
(0.01) 
7.52 
(0.05) 
The dependent variable is the share of exports relative to total OECD exports. Numbers in brackets 
below coefficients refer to t-statistics. Asterisks denote significance as: *** at 1%, ** at 5%. The 
endogenous variable in IV estimations is RULC; the instruments are GFCFt, GFCFt-1, ENEt and 
ENEt-1.The Wald test concerns the joint statistical significance of the regressors. Davidson-
MacKinnon tests for exogeneity and Sargan-Hansen tests the orthogonality condition for a panel. See 
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the text for more information about the distribution of these statistics. Numbers in parentheses refer to 
p-values of diagnostic tests. All estimates are consistent for cluster (country) robust 
heteroscedasticity.  
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Table 4: Export performance among OECD countries, 1980-2005: Dynamic Least 
Squared Dummy Variable (DLSD) Estimator 
 Spec1  Spec2   Spec3 
Exp(t-1) 0.783*** 0.546*** 0.625*** 
 (12.93) (4.72) (8.45) 
Exp(t-1)×EPL 0.019   
 (0.74)   
Exp(t-1)×Bar.Enter  0.110**  
  (2.36)  
Exp(t-1)×PMR   0.101** 
   (2.16) 
RULC -0.658** -0.811*** -0.738*** 
 (-2.69) (-3.02) (-3.28) 
R&D 0.033 0.058 0.040 
 (0.30) (0.56) (0.39) 
Tax 0.063 0.055 0.052 
 (1.45) (1.16) (1.10) 
(Tax)2 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (-1.49) (-1.32) (-1.22) 
Soc.Share -0.014 -0.011 -0.012 
 (-1.20) (-1.11) (-1.12) 
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects No No No 
Observations 420 420 420 
Adjusted R2 0.7107 0.7129 0.7124 
F 801.990 578.080 636.803 
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 
The dependent variable is the share of exports relative to total OECD exports. Numbers in brackets 
below coefficients refer to t-statistics. Asterisks denote significance as: *** at 1%, ** at 5%. The 
estimator used is a dynamic least squared dummy (DLSD) variable estimator with bootstrap corrected 
standard errors following the approach of Everaert and Pozzi (2007). 
 
 
Table 5: Implied long-run estimates from Within Fixed Effects Estimator 
RULC, γ

 -2.917 -1.691 -1.894 
R&D, γ

 0.267 0.179 0.170 
Tax, γ	

 0.290 0.119 0.138 
Soc, γ


 -0.065 -0.024 -0.032 
Notes. The three columns of this Table draw on the estimated coefficients shown in the corresponding 
three columns of Table 4. 
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Table 6: Export performance among OECD countries, 1980-2005: Pool Mean Group 
Estimator for Long Run Elasticities 
 PMG 
Long Run Estimates  
RULC -4.512*** 
 (-5.56) 
R&D 6.461*** 
 (7.57) 
Tax -0.135*** 
 (-4.68) 
Soc.Share -0.030*** 
 (-3.13) 
Short Run Coefficients  
Convergence Coefficient -0.124*** 
 (-2.62) 
∆.RULC(t-1) 1.689 
 (0.44) 
∆.RULC(t-2) 1.618 
 (0.70) 
∆.R&D(t-1) -0.214 
  (-0.20) 
∆.R&D(t-2) -0.630 
 (-0.57) 
∆.Tax(t-1) -0.023 
 (-0.34) 
∆.Tax(t-2) 0.005 
 (0.12) 
∆.Soc.Share(t-1) -0.067 
 (-1.54) 
∆.Soc.Share(t-2) -0.073 
 (-0.77) 
Constant 1.447** 
 (2.16) 
Observations 402 
Log-Likelihood 249.498 
The dependent variable is the share of exports relative to total OECD exports. Numbers in brackets 
below coefficients refer to z-statistics. Asterisks denote significance as follows, *** 1%, **5%. A 
constant is also included. Short run estimates are the means of the estimated coefficients across 18 
countries, individual country estimates are shown in Table 7. 
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Table 7: Short Run Coefficients of Pooled Mean Group Estimators (PMG) for 
Individual Countries 
 
 
∆ RULCt-1 ∆ RULCt-2 ∆ R&Dt-1 ∆ R&Dt-2 ∆ Taxt-1 ∆ Taxt-2 ∆ Soct-1 ∆ Soct-2 
Australia -1.629 1.884 0.046 0.189 -0.018 -0.002 -0.039 -0.039 
 
[-1.16] [1.95] [0.06] [0.26] [-0.38] [-0.07] [-0.93] [-1.21] 
Austria -1.868 0.958 3.075* -3.529** 0.005 -0.008 0.002 -0.002 
 
[-0.68] [0.54] [2.20] [-2.86] [0.14] [-0.32] [0.09] [-0.22] 
Belgium 3.785 -0.411 -5.509* 2.341 0.186 0.181 -0.058 0.104 
 
[0.58] [-0.10] [-2.52] [1.75] [0.73] [1.21] [-0.44] [1.47] 
Denmark -0.349 0.688 -0.895 -0.065 -0.046 0.031 -0.056 0.053 
 
[-0.21] [0.49] [-1.35] [-0.15] [-1.94] [1.72] [-1.54] [1.36] 
Spain 0.95 -0.077 1.327 -0.098 -0.171** 0.048 -0.043 0.021 
 
[0.40] [-0.04] [0.74] [0.10] [-2.87] [1.13] [-0.81] [0.43] 
Finland -2.307* 0.689 -0.413* 0.342 0.019 -0.016 -0.024* 0.01 
 
[-2.31] [1.12] [-2.25] [1.88] [1.09] [-1.70] [-2.55] [0.86] 
France -4.739 -0.455 -0.21 2.107 -0.369* 0.151 0.138 -0.057 
 
[-0.73] [-0.07] [-0.07] [1.13] [-2.05] [1.32] [1.27] [-0.67] 
Germany 13.102 -0.542 -0.992 0.165 -0.444 0.152 -0.012 0.343 
 
[0.75] [-0.04] [-0.25] [0.05] [-1.02] [0.56] [-0.03] [1.18] 
Greece 0.184 0.008 -0.694 0.245 0.007 -0.002 0.007 0.015 
 
[0.38] [0.03] [-0.77] [0.30] [0.81] [-0.44] [0.32] [1.13] 
Ireland -5.022*** 1.543 -0.035 -0.034 0.005 -0.015 -0.01 0.003 
 
[-4.39] [1.25] [-0.08] [-0.06] [0.30] [-1.29] [-0.73] [0.28] 
Italy -1.733 -0.175 -8.445** 3.145 0.118 -0.033 -0.09 0.213 
 
[-0.50] [-0.06] [-3.02] [1.61] [1.42] [-0.73] [-0.50] [1.63] 
Japan 60.160** -2.807 10.006** -17.34*** -0.595* 0.36 -0.566 -1.54*** 
 
[2.86] [-0.25] [2.90] [-4.33] [-2.35] [1.72] [-1.09] [-3.34] 
Korea -6.160*** 3.117*** -4.789*** 1.574** 0.744*** 0.427*** 0.160*** -0.06*** 
 
[-5.01] [3.63] [-3.89] [2.94] [4.34] [-3.93] [4.97] [-3.46] 
Netherlands 3.004 -13.099* -2.018 3.618** -0.160* 0.102* 0.085 0.116 
 
[0.52] [-2.48] [-1.07] [2.63] [-2.34] [2.18] [0.63] [1.11] 
Portugal -1.002 0.737 -0.532 0.296 0.042* -0.011 0.004 -0.002 
 
[-1.64] [1.68] [-0.83] [0.55] [2.36] [-1.08] [0.24] [-0.16] 
Sweden -3.801* 2.762* -0.376* -0.17 0.011 0.022 -0.055 0.03 
 
[-2.10] [2.01] [-2.29] [-1.07] [0.49] [1.23] [-1.87] [1.51] 
UK 2.547 -3.858 -2.798 1.683 0.077 -0.083 -0.155 0.013 
 
[0.49] [-1.10] [-1.07] [0.79] [0.64] [-1.17] [-1.18] [0.10] 
USA -24.722 38.16 9.406** -5.8 0.18 -0.36 -0.501 -0.52 
 
[-0.77] [1.77] [2.81] [-1.87] [0.54] [-1.46] [-0.79] [-0.84] 
Notes. Numbers in brackets below coefficients refer to absolute z-statistics. Asterisks denote significance as 
follows, *** 1%, **5%. These are individual coefficients for each country from estimated in Table 6.  
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Appendices 
Appendix A: Data Sources 
 Variable  Source 
Exports as share to total OECD  UNCTAD 
RULC EUKLEMS 
Tax share OECD-National Accounts 
Social Expenditure share OECD-National Accounts 
Private R&D share OECD-Science and Technology Indicators 
EPL OECD-Employment Database 
PMR OECD- Product Market Regulation Database 
Barriers to Entrepreneurship OECD- Product Market Regulation Database 
Barriers to Competition OECD- Product Market Regulation Database 
Barriers to FDI OECD- Product Market Regulation Database 
Multi Factor Productivity Growth (TFP) OECD-Productivity Statistics 
Human Capital Barro-Lee Data Set 
Property Rights Economic Freedom of the World (EFW) 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation (GFCF) as 
share to GDP  World Bank Development Indicators 
Energy of oil Equivalent (ENE) per Capita World Bank Development Indicators 
  
 
 
Appendix B: Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Export share 438 5.71 5.61 0.27 21.99 
RULC 450 1.00 0.18 0.74 1.69 
Tax share 450 35.70 8.40 15.65 52.26 
Social Expenditure share 450 20.98 6.28 3.00 36.20 
Private R&D share 450 1.01 0.63 0.03 2.96 
EPL 450 2.14 0.91 0.21 3.63 
Barriers to Entrepreneurship 450 2.25 0.45 1.45 3.05 
Barriers to Competition 450 2.41 0.52 1.72 3.22 
Barriers to FDI 450 1.59 0.74 0.09 2.92 
TFP 450 1.37 1.6 -2.9 7.8 
HC 450 7.16 5.78 0.39 30.04 
Rights  450 7.41 1.91 1.36 9.6 
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Appendix C: Methodology of construction of RULC 
Unit Labour Cost (ULC) combines information on: (i) cost per unit of labour input and (ii) an index of 
labour productivity. For country c at time t, we define ULC as follows (without subscripts): 
 
/
WULC
Y N
=
  (C1) 
  
W represents wages per worker measured as labour compensation per working hour while the lower 
ratio (Y/N) indicates labour productivity defined as value added per hour worked.18 RULC aims at 
reflecting cost competiveness in country c relative to cost in other countries of the sample. For that 
purpose, we weight ULC with the sample arithmetic mean of ULC (denoted by an overbar):  
 
,
,
c t
c t
t
ULC
RULC
ULC
=   (C2) 
For comparisons to be meaningful across countries, values in (C2) must be expressed in a common 
currency. We use Purchasing Power Parity (ppp)-exchange rate to express all values in constant 2000 
USD; additionally, the mean unit labour cost is computed as: 
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18
 The difference between H and N is that the former refers to total number of hours including self-employed 
while N refers only to total hours worked by employees. 
